Cybersecurity, Encryption, and Defense Industry Compliance with United States Export Regulations by Richerson Eichler, Rose
Texas A&M Journal of Property 
Law 
Volume 5 
Number 1 Defense Symposium Edition Article 2 
8-1-2018 
Cybersecurity, Encryption, and Defense Industry Compliance with 
United States Export Regulations 
Rose Richerson Eichler 
rosanne.r.eichler@lmco.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/journal-of-property-law 
 Part of the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rose Richerson Eichler, Cybersecurity, Encryption, and Defense Industry Compliance with United States 
Export Regulations, 5 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 5 (2018). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V5.I1.2 
This Symposia Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Texas A&M Journal of Property Law by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law 
Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
CYBERSECURITY, ENCRYPTION, AND DEFENSE
INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES
EXPORT REGULATIONS
By Rose Richerson Eichler†
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. ENCRYPTION AND ENCRYPTED ITEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III. EXPORT REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Encryption Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. Government Interest in Regulating Exports . . . . . . . . . . 14
D. Government Interest in Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
E. International Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
IV. ENCRYPTION, SENSITIVE INFORMATION, AND THE
DEFENSE INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Sensitive Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Employees Traveling Internationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
V. THE REGULATION DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. The Problem with Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B. The Need for Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
VI. DEFENSE INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS . 24
A. General Government Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Compliance Programs in Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VII. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A. Regulation Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B. Keeping Up in the Defense Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
I. INTRODUCTION
Exports of technology and items containing technical information
are regulated by the United States government.1 United States export
control regulations exist to help protect national security, economic,
and political interests.2  United States defense industry companies
manufacture products and develop technologies and information that
the United States has a particular interest in protecting.3 Therefore,
defense industry companies must comply with United States export
† Rose Richerson Eichler is a Texas A&M University School of Law alum and
former staff member of the Journal of Property Law. Mrs. Eichler is a regulatory
compliance analyst for the International Trade Compliance Office, Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics in Fort Worth, Texas.
1. See generally International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130
(2017); Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2017).
2. 15 C.F.R. § 730.6 (2018).
3. See generally 22 C.F.R. § 120.
5
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control regulations when exporting items and information to their in-
ternational partners and customers.4
An “export” not only includes shipments of hardware or other tan-
gible assets to foreign end-users but also includes the sharing of cer-
tain types of information with foreign recipients in the form of phone
conversations, emails, meetings, conferences, presentations, and so
on.5 Many employees of defense industry companies travel interna-
tionally with company issued laptops and cellphones containing com-
pany information that could be viewed by foreign persons. All of
these activities are considered exports and may require prior authori-
zation from the United States government under export control regu-
lations. Failure to follow export regulations could result in a violation
requiring a report to the United States government that may result in
civil penalties or criminal charges.6 Additionally, intentional as well as
unintentional releases of information to certain foreign persons could
be detrimental to a defense industry company’s business and reputa-
tion and may even result in security concerns for the United States.
Although the government has an interest in regulating defense in-
dustry companies’ technology and information, critics argue that
strong export control regulations may result in invasions of privacy,
violations of free speech, and a displacement of the United States as a
leader in a world of technological advancement.7 However, despite
current regulations, defense industry information is still at risk of
cyberattacks and inadvertent data releases, creating potential threats
to national security and the security of company technology and
information.8
In an effort to secure company and sensitive information while ex-
porting, defense industry companies utilize encryption and other
cybersecurity measures. Advancing technologies in cybersecurity can
help the government and defense industry companies by bolstering
the security of their information. These same advancements can also
aid attackers in breaking through cybersecurity defenses. Some
advances in technology are even preventing law enforcement from
gathering necessary information to conduct investigations when cyber-
4. Id.; see generally 15 C.F.R. § 730.6.
5. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10; 15 C.F.R. § 774.
6. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12; 15 C.F.R. § 764.5.
7. Mark T. Pasko, Re-Defining National Security in the Technology Age: The En-
cryption Export Debate, 26 J. LEGIS. 337, 350 (2000).
8. See also Barry K. Shelton & Chris R. Johnson, A Brief History of Encryption,
TECHNEWSWORLD (July 19, 2010), https://www.technewsworld.com/story/70437.html
(“A recent concern is the susceptibility of the power grid and other national infra-
structure to a systemic, organized attack on the United States from other nations or
terrorist organizations.”) [https://perma.cc/YQJ9-KYNL]; Martha Finnemore &
Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT’L L.
426 (2016) (“Cyber insecurity has become the new normal, making cybersecurity a
global priority not just for [information and communication technologies] companies
but for nation-states, industry, and users generally.”).
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attacks occur, making it difficult to identify criminal actors and seek
justice.
The United States government faces challenges in creating and up-
dating regulations to keep up with consistently advancing technology.
Likewise, defense industry companies must adhere to government
regulations by creating robust compliance programs, but they should
also implement security and compliance measures above and beyond
what the government requires to ensure more effective security for
their technology and information.
This Article discusses the effect of advancing cyber technology;
United States export regulations; reporting requirements related to
the export of encrypted items; and encryption technology in the de-
fense industry. First, the Article defines encryption and encrypted
items. Second, the Article explains United States regulations of ex-
ports and specifically, regulations related to encryption and encrypted
items. Third, the Article explains the need for defense industry com-
panies to export and to use encrypted items. Fourth, the Article ana-
lyzes criticisms of export regulations and the differing views on United
States controls. Fifth, the Article will discuss the complexities of com-
plying with export regulations and defense industry compliance pro-
grams. Sixth, the Article examines the outlook for encryption
technology, the future of regulations related to cybersecurity, and the
outlook for defense industry security measures and compliance with
regulations.
II. ENCRYPTION AND ENCRYPTED ITEMS
Sending information over the internet leaves it vulnerable to inter-
ceptions from other internet users while it is traveling to its intended
destination.9 Encryption is “the ability to store and transmit informa-
tion in a form that is unreadable to anyone other than intended per-
sons.”10 The currently preferred method of encryption is end-to-end
encryption—when only the sender and recipient of the information
can decrypt the data with a special key.11 Only the sender and recipi-
9. See also Nadeem Unuth, What is End-to-End Encryption? How Your Data is
Kept Private on the Web, LIFEWIRE (last updated Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.lifewire
.com/what-is-end-to-end-encryption-4028873 (“Once you send the data packets of
your voice call, chat, email or credit card number over the jungle of the Internet, you
have no control over who lays their hands on them.”) [https://perma.cc/GVF6-
EDGX].
10. Shelton & Johnson, supra note 9; see also Unuth, supra note 10 (“Encryption
involves turning your data into a scrambled form such that it is impossible for any
party intercepting it to read, understand and make any sense of it, except the recipient
to whom it is intended.”).
11. Unuth, supra note 10; Lucian Armasu, End-to-End Encryption Could’ve Pro-
tected Yahoo Mail Users From 2014 Breach And NSA Spying; TOM’SHARDWARE
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/e2ee-yahoo-mail-hack-spying,32
857.html (“End-to-End encryption, also referred to as E2EE, involves the encryption
of data on a device before it is sent over a network. In the event of a data breach of a
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ent have the ability to see the information; the entity providing the
encryption service does not have the ability to decrypt the code. This
process means that services could not access information and provide
it to the government or other third parties.12
Encryption technology got its start during World War II with
mechanical machines that evolved into electronics and computers by
the 1960s.13 Encryption is now used in standard business transactions,
such as money transfers or log-in options for websites.14 In addition to
business and industry use, individuals use encryption for the transfer
of information over email.15 Use of encryption to protect data is in-
creasing for businesses and individuals. Engineers often build encryp-
tion software into laptops, and owners can easily use the software.16
The key is setting a strong password to ensure only the user and the
intended recipient can access an encrypted file.17
In 1977, IBM created and the National Security Agency modified
the Federal Information Processing Standard (“FIPS”) 46—which was
the current Data Encryption Standard (“DES”)—and it utilized a 56-
bit key (256 Or 72,057,594,037,927,936).18 The National Institute of
Standards and Technology determines these standardizations although
it is a non-regulatory federal agency.19 As technology advanced, DES
was breakable by the 1990s, and two Belgian developers created its
replacement in 2000. By November 2001, FIPS 197 was published for
the standard encryption used today: Advanced Encryption Standard
(“AES”) which requires both senders and receivers to use the same
key to decipher the encrypted code.20 AES requires users to securely
store their key, so it is not acquired by unintended users.21 AES uses
network, such as an email service, any communications sent using E2EE will not be
exposed to that breach.”) [https://perma.cc/X3ZX-7FVZ].
12. See Unuth, supra note 10 (“For many other services that offer encryption, the
data is encrypted during transfer but is protected only from outside intruders like
hackers. The service can intercept the data at their servers and use them. They can
potentially hand the data to third parties or to law enforcement authorities.”).
13. Pasko, supra note 8, at 338.
14. C. Mitchell Shaw, Surveillance Hawks Plan New Legislative Attacks on En-
cryption, NEW AM. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.thenewamerican.com/tech/compu
ters/item/28780-surveillance-hawks-plan-new-legislative-attacks-on-encryption [https:/
/perma.cc/8NUN-L66K]; see also Alex Castle, How to Encrypt (Almost) Anything, PC
WORLD (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2025462/how-to-encrypt-al-
most-anything.html (“Encryption is a great way to keep valuable data safe—whether
you’re transmitting it over the Internet, backing it up on a server, or just carrying it
through airport security on your laptop.”) [https://perma.cc/L9R6-BKL9].
15. Shaw, supra note 15.
16. Castle, supra note 15.
17. Id.
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128-, 192-, and 256- bit keys, making cyberattacks more difficult than
DES.22 The current standard AES is FIPS 140-2.23
Encryption is used in defense industry production, manufacture,
and company assets provided to all employees, such as company is-
sued laptops and cellphones. The use of encryption assists companies
in safeguarding their products, and encryption should be utilized to
protect the nation’s technology and information produced within the
defense industry. Defense industry companies should consider tech-
nology standards when choosing encryption products and services,
and the companies must also comply with United States government
export regulations when exporting encrypted items and information.
III. EXPORT REGULATIONS
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and the
Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) are the two primary
regulations that defense industry companies are required to comply
with when exporting their products and information to foreign recipi-
ents.24 The Department of State implements the ITAR and the ITAR
controls all items listed on the United States Munitions List
(“USML”).25 The Department of Commerce implements the EAR
and the EAR controls all items found on the Commerce Control List
(“CCL”).26 The USML contains defense articles, defense services, and
technical data related to defense articles.27 The CCL contains “dual-
use” items, or items that can be used for a civil or military purpose.28
For the export of items on the USML, the ITAR requires an export
authorization prior to export.29 Applications for export authorizations
must be submitted to and approved by the Department of State, Of-
fice of Defense Trade Controls before a company may export USML
items.30 Some items on the USML may qualify for an exemption, in
which case prior approval for export is not required, though there are
other requirements and limitations to using an exemption.31 For the
export of items on the CCL and any other items not listed on the
USML, the EAR may require an export authorization prior to export,
22. Id.
23. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FIPS
PUB 140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES (2001),
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/140/2/final/documents/fips1402.pdf.
24. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2017); 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2018).
25. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1–2.
26. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1, 738.1(a)(1).
27. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 120.4.
28. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
29. 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.1, 124.1.
30. Id.
31. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16.
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though many items will qualify for an exception or may not require an
export authorization at all.32
Failure to comply with the ITAR or EAR constitutes a violation
that could result in monetary penalties, criminal charges, or other pen-
alties for companies and individuals.33 However, both the Department
of State and the Department of Commerce allow companies to submit
reports disclosing discovered violations.34 The submission of a disclo-
sure could decrease or eliminate any penalties though the decision is
at the discretion of the regulating agency.35 A violation could be any
of the following: (1) exporting without an approved export authoriza-
tion when one is required; (2) failing to comply with the requirements
of an approved export authorization; and (3) submitting false or mis-
leading annual or semiannual reports, etc.36
The shipment of manufactured products overseas is only a portion
of international defense industry transfers that require compliance
with export control regulations. Defense industry companies also dis-
cuss technical information with foreign persons over the phone, in
meetings, through email, and during presentations, and thus, these in-
ternational transfers are exports that may be controlled by export con-
trol regulations.
A. Exports
The Merriam-Webster defines the word “export” as “to carry away”
or “to carry or send (something, such as a commodity) to some other
place (such as another country).”37 Dictionary.com defines “export”
as “to ship (commodities) to other countries or places for sale, ex-
change, etc.” and “to send or transmit (ideas, institutions, etc.) to an-
other place, especially another country.”38
Those who do not regularly ship items internationally may consider
an export to be the shipping of a tangible item to an international
destination. They may even consider an “export” to be a more official
transaction that involves special shipping paperwork and government
oversight. That idea is partially correct, but within the defense indus-
try and for United States government agencies, such as the Depart-
32. 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (“A relatively small percentage of exports and reexports
subject to the EAR require an application to BIS for a license. Many items are not on
the Commerce Control List (CCL) (Supplement No. 1 to §774.1 of the EAR), or, if
on the CCL, require a license to only a limited number of countries. Other transac-
tions may be covered by one or more of the License Exceptions in the EAR. In such
cases, no application need be made to BIS.”).
33. 22 C.F.R. §§ 127.1, 127.3; 15 C.F.R. §§ 764.2–.3.
34. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12; 15 C.F.R. § 764.5.
35. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12; 15 C.F.R. § 764.5.
36. 22 C.F.R. § 127.1; 15 C.F.R. § 764.2.
37. Export, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
export (last updated May 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F4H8-8EAF].
38. Export, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/export (last vis-
ited May 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W4CC-344P].
2019] COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. EXPORT REGULATIONS 11
ment of State and the Department of Commerce, an “export” can
include more than just the shipping of tangible materials abroad. The
EAR explains:
Certain actions that you might not regard as an “export” in other
contexts do constitute an export subject to the EAR. The release of
technology to a foreign national in the United States through such
means as demonstration or oral briefing is deemed an export. Other
examples of exports under the EAR include the return of foreign
equipment to its country of origin after repair in the United States,
shipments from a [United States] foreign trade zone, and the elec-
tronic transmission of non-public data that will be received
abroad.39
For international companies in the defense industry, the ITAR and
EAR define “export.” The ITAR defines an export as “[a]n actual
shipment or transmission out of the United States, including the send-
ing or taking of a defense article out of the United States in any man-
ner,”40 but also includes the transfer of technical data to a foreign
person whether that foreign person is located in the United States or
outside of the United States, otherwise known as a “deemed ex-
port.”41 As the ITAR is specific to regulation of defense articles, an
export can also include the transfer of ownership, control, or registra-
tion of an aircraft or any other item subject to the ITAR by a United
States person to a foreign person, including an embassy or any of its
agencies located in the United States.42 The ITAR also recognizes the
performance of defense services for a foreign person as an export,
whether or not that service occurs abroad or in the United States.43 A
defense service can include providing assistance, such as training, in
the “design[ing], develop[ing], engineering, [and] manufactur[ing],”
etc. of a defense article, providing a foreign person with technical data
as defined by the ITAR or military training of foreign forces.44
Under the ITAR and EAR a “foreign person” is someone who is
not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States, a company
incorporated in another country, or a foreign government.45 Under
the ITAR specifically, if someone (or a company) releases technical
data to a foreign person who holds citizenship in multiple non-United
States countries, the United States considers that release an export to
each country where the foreign person holds citizenship.46
The ITAR controls the export of “technical data,” which is any in-
formation “required for the design, development, production, manu-
39. 15 C.F.R. § 730.5(c).
40. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1).
41. Id.
42. Id. §§ 120.17(a)(3)–(4).
43. Id. § 120.17(a)(5).
44. Id. § 120.9(a)(1)–(3).
45. Id. § 120.16; 15 C.F.R. § 772.
46. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(b).
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facture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or
modification of defense articles.”47 Technical data “includes informa-
tion in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instruc-
tion or documentation.”48 Technical data does not include any
information officially released to the public, basic marketing informa-
tion, or information that can be taught in engineering courses.49
Similarly, the EAR controls the export of “technology” which is
“information necessary for the ‘development,’ ‘production,’ ‘use,’ op-
eration, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing”
of an item not listed on the USML.50 The defense industry commonly
refers to ITAR technical data and EAR technology as “export con-
trolled information.”
Therefore, the ITAR and EAR restrict the movement of any item
found on the USML and CCL whether tangible or intangible. This
interchange includes the shipment of defense articles, commercial
hardware, tools, equipment, or other produced or manufactured items
from the United States to a foreign country. An export could also oc-
cur in a number of other ways that may not seem apparent when first
reading the regulations.
For example, an email sent to a foreign person with an attached
document that contains ITAR technical data is considered an export
and would require an export authorization prior to sending. A tele-
phone conversation between United States citizens and citizens of
France detailing EAR technology may require a Department of Com-
merce export license prior to conducting the call. A defense industry
company employee traveling for business and using his company
laptop to view ITAR technical data may inadvertently cause an export
if a citizen of the United Kingdom glances at the employee’s laptop
screen.
It becomes easy to see from the above examples how critical it re-
mains for defense industry companies to understand export regula-
tions. The risks are even higher for companies exporting sensitive or
classified information, and companies should take appropriate secur-
ity measures to protect the information. Encryption is one method
that defense industry companies can use to protect their information.
B. Encryption Regulations
The Department of State previously regulated encryption exports,
which were listed on the USML because, due to their advanced tech-
nological capabilities compared to what the rest of the world was pro-
ducing at the time, they were viewed and therefore classified as
47. Id. § 120.10(a)(1)
48. Id.
49. Id. § 120.10(b).
50. 15 C.F.R. § 772.
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munitions.51 In 1996, President Clinton’s Executive Order 13026 tran-
sitioned encryption software from the USML to the CCL and altered
regulation from the Department of State to the Department of Com-
merce.52 At that time, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
was the governing jurisdiction; in 2002, BXA became the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS).53
The Clinton Administration is responsible for enacting new mea-
sures to reform encryption export regulations.54 For example, the ad-
ministration instituted policy that permitted more powerful
encryption technology and enabled the mass marketing of higher
strength encryption products.55
Some encrypted items require an export license issued by the BIS
before a company may export the encrypted items to a foreign recipi-
ent.56 However, many encrypted items qualify for the Encryption
Commodities, Software and Technology (“ENC”) exception under the
EAR and do not require a license for export, but requirements and
limitations exist when using the ENC exception.57 For example, the
exporter must list the exception on all shipping documents, and some
exports may need to be reported to BIS annually or semiannually.58
Exporters may use the ENC exceptions for most encrypted items, but
some items destined for certain locations may require a license before
export.59
The EAR contains multilateral controls and unilateral controls for
the export of encrypted items. Member nations to the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement determine multilateral controls, and the United States gov-
ernment determines unilateral controls.60
Companies exporting encrypted items have three separate reports
to submit to BIS: (1) EAR § 740.17(e)(1) requires semiannual report-
ing of all exports of encrypted items to all foreign destinations except
Canada, although some items may be excluded from the report, such
as items with a key length that is less than 64 bits;61 (2) EAR § 743.1
Wassenaar Arrangement; and (3) § 742 Supplement 8: Self-Classifica-
51. Pasko, supra note 8, at 339–40.
52. Id. at 340; Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (Nov. 15, 1996); see 50
U.S.C.A. § 4603 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 115-188).
53. Pasko, supra note 8, at 340; see also Bureau of Indus. and Sec., U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, BIS, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php (last visited May 1, 2018).
54. Pasko, supra note 8, at 341.
55. Id.
56. Bureau of Indus. and Sec., supra note 54.
57. 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (2018).
58. Id. §§ 762.2, 743, 764.4.
59. Bureau of Indus. and Sec. When a License is Required, BIS, https://www.bis
.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/encryption/5-licenses/a-when-a-license-is-required
(last visited May 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QP85-G52E].
60. Bureau of Indus. and Sec., supra note 54.
61. 15 C.F.R. § 740.17(e)(1).
14 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
tion Report for Encryption requires companies to annually report on
certain encryption items that the company exported or re-exported.62
Although it may be cumbersome for defense industry companies to
track, record, and report on the export of encrypted items and encryp-
tion technology, the United States government has a valid interest in
regulating these transactions.
C. Government Interest in Regulating Exports
To promote world peace and ensure security and further foreign
policy in the United States, the President shall control the import and
export of defense articles and services by providing guidance to
United States persons who export and import defense articles and ser-
vices.63 The President shall determine what items constitute defense
articles and defense services, and the list of these items is the USML.
The President promulgates the ITAR.64
General EAR provisions “are intended to serve the national secur-
ity, foreign policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and other interests of the United States, which in many cases are re-
flected in international obligations or arrangements.”65 Encryption is
a dual-use item because it can be used for commercial purposes or for
military purposes.66 The United States government is interested in
controlling the export of encryption and encrypted items because of
the effects these exports have on the United States economy and law
enforcement.67
Regulating the export of the United States’ produced and devel-
oped encrypted items and information requires the government’s un-
derstanding of cybersecurity services and risks.
D. Government Interest in Cybersecurity
The United States government takes additional measures to ensure
national cybersecurity in addition to export regulations. The United
States Cyber Command was established in October 2010 and:
Plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities
to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of
Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed,
62. Id. §§ 742, 743.1.
63. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (2014).
64. Id.
65. 15 C.F.R. § 730.6.
66. See Innokenty Pyetranker, An Umbrella in a Hurricane: Cyber Technology
and the December 2013 Amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement, 13 NW. J. TECH &
INTELL. PROP. 153, 164 (2015) (“[C]oncerted action—rather than passive pessimism—
must be our response to cyber threats . . . Encryption technology is dual-use in that it
can be used to, for instance, protect consumer data (a civilian purpose) and intercept
enemy communications during armed conflict and prevent terrorist attacks (military
purposes.”).
67. Id. at 165.
2019] COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. EXPORT REGULATIONS 15
conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to en-
able actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in
cyberspace, and deny the same to our adversaries. The Command
unifies the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DoD
cyberspace capabilities to operate resilient, reliable information and
communication networks, counter cyberspace threats, and assure
access to cyberspace. USCYBERCOM is designing the cyber force
structure, training requirements and certification standards that will
enable the Services to build the cyber force required to execute our
assigned missions. The command also works closely with inter-
agency and international partners in executing these critical
missions.68
A new policy bill pushing for better cybersecurity measures for the
Department of Defense is currently supported by some United States
senators.69 One portion of this proposed bill is to give the Secretary of
Defense more authority in utilizing cyber activities to conduct military
operations.70 This move by senators comes after “recent develop-
ments with DoD’s primary warfighting organization, United States
Cyber Command, and its new status as a fully unified command.”71
Additionally, “the Senate panel suggested giving the executive branch
the authority to direct Cyber Command to ‘take appropriate and pro-
portional action through cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter sys-
tematic and ongoing attacks by Russia in cyberspace.’”72
The United States is not the only country concerned with cyber-
security and the regulation of exports and imports. Other countries
conduct business internationally and recognize the need for standard-
ized practices and oversight of international exchanges of information
and technology.
E. International Regulations
In addition to United States export regulations, other countries
maintain their own export control regulations. Defense industry com-
panies involved in exporting and importing goods need to familiarize
themselves with other countries’ export control laws to ensure compli-
ance. Many countries agree that cyberattacks pose a significant threat
to international business, and efforts to protect against such threats
68. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (last updated Mar. 2015),
http://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/CYBERCOM_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
69. Mark Pomerleau, Senators Look to Emphasize U.S. Cyber Prowess, FIFTH DO-
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are discussed and implemented by these concerned parties who hope
to harmonize export standards.73
By combining efforts and creating a harmonized system of export
controls, countries may be able to work together in successfully
preventing cyberattacks and data hacking initiated by their shared en-
emies.74 In creating a common encryption export control regime, the
United States can replace extreme regulations and avoid the risk of
losing market share to competing countries with lesser controls.75 Ad-
ditionally, these combined efforts “will strengthen the United States’
encryption industry and in doing so, further American security
interests.”76
During the Cold War, Soviet powers acquired western technology,
and as a result of fear that this technology would be used against the
West, the Western Bloc powers created the Coordinating Committee
for the Control of Multinational Trade (“COCOM”).77 In 1996, after
the Cold War, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (The
Wassenaar Arrangement) replaced COCOM.78 Thirty-three member
states met to add items to the Munitions List and the List of Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies that are subject to control under the Was-
senaar Arrangement.79 The goal of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to
coordinate with member states to create an export control system for
all parties.80 Each member state commits to controlling these lists,
controlling the movement of items on the lists, and to sharing infor-
mation with each other.81 In 1996, more member states joined after
the initial meeting, and more could still join should they commit to the
same policies as the other member states.82 Member country repre-
sentatives now meet each December in Vienna, Austria to make deci-
73. See Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 157 (“Multilateral efforts to tackle cyber-
crime, cyber crises, and the export of cyber technology illustrate the seriousness with
which world leaders treat cyberspace.”).
74. See Pasko, supra note 8, at 345 (“Limiting the enforcement of encryption regu-
lations to the United States will do little to deter terrorists or criminals from using
encryption as long as those individuals can obtain such material from other industrial-
ized nations.”).
75. Id. at 345–46 (“[A]llowing a rigid encryption export regime punishes Ameri-
can companies because as these companies comply with tight regulations, their for-
eign competitors gain market share at their expense.”).
76. Id. at 346.
77. Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 159.
78. Id. See generally The Waasenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conven-
tional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, https://www.wassenaar.org/ (last
updated Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Waasenaar] [https://perma.cc/CMN3-J2EC].
79. Waasenaar, supra note 79; Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 160.
80. Waasenaar, supra note 79.
81. Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 161; Waasenaar, supra note 79.
82. Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 161–62; Waasenaar, supra note 79.
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sions by consensus.83 The Wassenaar Arrangement website provides
this purpose statement:
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) has been established in order to
contribute to regional and international security and stability, by
promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus
preventing destabilising accumulations. The aim is also to prevent
the acquisition of these items by terrorists. Participating States seek,
through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these
items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of mili-
tary capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted
to support such capabilities.84
The United States’ EAR controls over the export of encryption
items is “[c]onsistent with our international obligations as a member
of the Wassenaar Arrangement.”85 United States and international ex-
port controls impact defense industry company transactions involving
encryption, encrypted items, and sensitive information.
IV. ENCRYPTION, SENSITIVE INFORMATION,
AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Encryption plays many roles within the defense industry. Compa-
nies develop software for use in manufacturing certain products that
include encryption; encrypt the transfer of sensitive information to
parties outside of their company and the United States; and require
their employees travel with company laptops and cellphones that in-
clude encryption properties.
United States export control laws regulate encrypted items. De-
fense industry companies also export encrypted items and encryption
technology to international customers including foreign governments
and companies incorporated in foreign countries. United States De-
fense Industry companies selling their products, services, and data to
foreign companies and governments must follow the government ex-
port regulations.
Compliance with these regulations requires a tedious order of re-
view to determine which jurisdiction of regulations each item falls
under. Items manufactured for the defense industry fall under the
ITAR, and dual-use items (those items not specifically designed for a
military application and with commercial uses) fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the EAR. After determining jurisdiction, proper classification
of an item is required. The ITAR regulates items found on the USML.
The EAR regulates items found on the CCL. These lists are long and
detailed and determining the correct classification of an item requires
83. Waasenaar, supra note 79.
84. Id.
85. 15 C.F.R. § 742.15 (2018).
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a complete understanding of the item, its uses, capabilities, the end-
user, and end-use. Once a company determines the correct jurisdiction
and classification of an item, it must then determine whether or not
the item requires approval from a United States government agency
for export to its foreign end-user.
If approval is required, a company must submit an application for
an export authorization to the Department of State for the export of
items governed by the ITAR or the Department of Commerce for the
export of items governed by the EAR.86 Exporters must wait for
agency approval before exporting the product. Additional require-
ments such as shipment tracking, record keeping, reporting, and other
limitations may apply when using an approved export authorization.87
Transfer of sensitive information is susceptible to unauthorized re-
leases and data hacking; defense industry companies can protect infor-
mation with cybersecurity measures including the use of encryption.
A. Sensitive Information
Exporters can use defense industry encryption strategies to protect
information and technology.88 Sensitive company information in-
cludes intellectual property, trade secrets, research and development,
new technologies, personal employee information, customer lists, etc.
For defense industry companies, the risks of cybercrime impact na-
tional security, economy interests, foreign policy and treaty compli-
ance, and United States technology leadership.89
Cybersecurity is multifaceted within the defense industry. Data
saved on employee laptops related to their work, whether classified or
unclassified, technical data, or proprietary information, is at risk of
cyberattack. Employees need computers and cellphones to conduct
business, but access to the internet puts company secrets at risk. Use
of email, opening documents from unknown senders, sending docu-
ments to recipients who are not authorized to receive the documents,
and traveling internationally with company assets are all risk areas for
defense industry companies to consider.
Phishing is a form of data hacking used to obtain passwords and
information, including military and financial data by phishers posing
as a trust-worthy source in an e-mail.90 Spear phishing is much more
targeted because a phisher will use information in an email, such as
names and relevant language, to create the appearance of legiti-
86. See id. § 730.7.
87. Id. § 762.
88. See Shelton & Johnson, supra note 9.
89. 15 C.F.R. § 730.6; see generally 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2017).
90. Staff Sgt. Samuel Morse, Spear Phishers Target Military Members at Home,
Work, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (Feb. 12, 2010) http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/
News/News-Article-View/Article/983525/spear-phishers-target-military-members-at-
home-work/ [https://perma.cc/4N7L-RHBQ].
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macy.91 Hackers use regular phishing in identify theft attempts, but
spear phishing “on government systems is usually an attempt to gather
information and intelligence.”92 A spear phisher will send a link or
attachment hoping the email recipient will open it so the phisher’s
“malicious logic” will download, providing access to data that the
phisher seeks.93 Employees should use digital signatures and en-
crypted emails when connected to the company’s network.94 Person-
nel in the defense industry, whether military or civilian, should utilize
encrypted emails that are password protected in their correspondence.
When internal users and trusted outside contacts both use encrypted
emails, the risk of successful phishing and spear phishing attempts is
minimized.
Another cybersecurity threat defense industry companies must ad-
dress is the insider threat. Defense industry companies routinely give
employees, contractors, and other agents working for a defense indus-
try company the access to company information. This act leaves com-
panies vulnerable to misconduct, whether intentional or unintentional.
For example, third parties may approach employees to steal company
information for a profit, but more commonly, employees do not safe-
guard their passwords effectively or do not practice secure transfer-
ring methods, allowing them to get into the wrong hands.95
Cyberattacks may also occur for personal hackers to display their
skills, to promote particular causes, or to produce a profit.96 Defense
industry employees expose companies to additional risks when they
use company assets on international travel.
B. Employees Traveling Internationally
Defense industry companies sending employees overseas increase
“the risk of unauthorized access to United States controlled informa-
tion, including sensitive network data and data critical to the United
States domestic communications infrastructure.”97
Many defense industry employees with international customers and
partners are required to travel outside of the United States to conduct
business. It remains no surprise that these employees will take their





95. See Bomgar Publishes 2018 Privileged Access Threat Report, BOMGAR (April
16, 2018), https://www.bomgar.com/press/privileged-access-threat-report [hereinafter
Bomgar] [https://perma.cc/9CGU-FBTV].
96. Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 9, at 434–35.
97. Pablo LeCour, Tina Carlile & Ziyu Chin, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) –
Enhanced Security Plan Sets Best Practices for Use of Cloud Services for Sensitive
Data, EXPORT COMPLIANCE TRAINING INST. BLOG; (April 4, 2018), https://www.learn
exportcompliance.com/blog/ [https://perma.cc/EHK5-DQJU].
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travel. Defense corporations should monitor employee travel to en-
sure compliance with export regulations.
Employees traveling internationally with company assets may not
only require an export authorization for the laptop, cellphone or other
asset but may also require additional authorization to take certain in-
formation stored on the asset. The BIS ENC exception may be used as
authorization for the majority of company assets traveling overseas
with employees.98
The United States government has reasons for so closely regulating
the export of encryption technology and encrypted items. However,
different sides of the debate argue about the level and intensity of
regulations.
V. THE REGULATION DEBATE
A. The Problem with Regulations
United States exports regulations “are at the center of the debate
over whether or not strict controls on encryption exports actually in-
crease national security.”99 Some critics argue that strict regulations
result in lost revenues for United States companies because, at least in
the past, other countries allowed for the export of stronger encryption
technologies.100 Although intended “to promote economic growth and
strengthen national security,” export control regulations “have actu-
ally damaged America’s national security by hampering its technologi-
cal growth.”101
The United States used to be the leader in encryption technology
and America’s allies were once willing to follow our lead.102 However,
“[s]ince the end of the Cold War . . . America’s traditional allies have
little to gain by following America’s notions of national security.”103
Competing countries no longer “see America’s global economic and
political power as a reason to follow the American lead, but rather,
they view it as a challenge to compete more robustly in the interna-
tional marketplace.”104 The United States must now attempt to col-
laborate with other countries on global security efforts because
collaboration both helps the United States and the entire international
community.105
With recent export control reform and a push for additional up-
dates, the United States is “easing the restrictions on the export of
encryption technology” which will allow the United States “to work
98. 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (2018).
99. Pasko, supra note 8, at 339.
100. Id. at 340.
101. Id. at 337–38.
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with other countries in establishing an effective encryption export re-
gime.”106 Continued regulation changes and collaboration with other
countries is also necessary for more efficient encryption exports.107
However, “[a]s a consequence of encryption’s success and wide-
spread use, the United States is faced with the challenge of balancing
its need to compete economically by ensuring its encryption products
are widely available in foreign markets while at the same time protect-
ing its national security interests.”108
Current international collaborations are not without their faults.
Critics of the Wassenaar Arrangement assert that the restriction of
encryption exports violates free speech rights because “coded lan-
guage communications are protected as a right of free expression
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which most members of the Wassenaar are parties.”109 Another side
of the debate asserts that the Wassenaar Arrangement does not en-
force rules adequately and does not bind any member state to its poli-
cies since no penalty exists for failing to enforce laws.110  The
Wassenaar Arrangement is seen as just a group of member states ex-
changing information on export controls but is not a real governing
authority to enforce the organization’s goals.111 International attempts
to keep encryption technology within the control of member nations
as the technology advances and has the ability to cross boundaries so
easily remains challenging despite criticism.112
The risks to national, business, and personal security may require
some control over the international exchange of information and
technology.
B. The Need for Regulations
Encryption technology and data stored on encrypted items are ex-
ported from the United States to foreign persons, companies, and gov-
ernments every day. While these transfers may be a part of fulfilling
business contracts, the United States government is interested in se-
curing the information and technology exchanged. The government
asserts some control over the export of these items to ensure the
safety of this information and technology. The government will also
investigate when information and items are hacked or stolen.
In 2015, Executive Assistant Director of the Science and Technol-
ogy Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Amy
Hess, issued a statement on Encryption and Cyber Security for Mobile
106. Id. at 351.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 339.
109. Id. at 341.
110. Pyetranker, supra at 67, at 166–67.
111. Id. at 168.
112. Id. at 170.
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and Electronic Communication Devices.113 In her statement, Hess ad-
dressed continually evolving national security and criminal threats
that require the FBI to constantly question whether it is addressing
those threats effectively.114
Hess asserted that security and cybersecurity threats continue to
grow, and the FBI must adapt “to stay ahead of changing threats and
changing technology.”115 The FBI recognizes that the United States is
interested “in promoting innovation and the competiveness of United
States companies in the global marketplace, as well as freedom of ex-
pression around the world.”116 However, when ensuring national se-
curity and seeking justice for cybercrimes, law enforcement has two
issues to deal with: First, “legally authorized real-time interception of
what we call ‘data in motion,’ such as phone calls, e-mail, text
messages and chat sessions in transit.” Second, “legally authorized ac-
cess to data stored on devices, such as e-mail, text messages, photos,
and videos—or what we call ‘data at rest.’”117 Both of these data areas
are “increasingly encrypted.”118
The government must access information to investigate properly,
but most communication services companies no longer “have the abil-
ity to isolate and deliver particular information when ordered to do so
by a court.”119 Unencrypted metadata, “is incomplete information”
and “difficult to analyze when time is of the essence.”120 Stored data is
not a new frontier for government officials, but advancements to the
technology, including automatic encryption settings with stronger en-
cryption on devices and networks, make it increasingly difficult for
law enforcement to gather information.121 For example, communica-
tion services companies sell encryption technology that even they can-
not decrypt.122 This seemingly bulletproof system may be
advantageous to a user wanting to secure personal information from
113. Amy Hess, Encryption and Cyber Security for Mobile Electronic Communica-







118. Id.; see also Shaw, supra note 13 (“The upswing in the use of powerful encryp-
tion to protect data-at-rest (data stored on a device such as a computer, mobile de-
vice, external hard drive, or USB stick) and data-in-motion (data being sent from one
device to another over mobile towers, the Internet, or another network) is the direct
result of people reacting what Edward Snowden revealed to the world in May 2103:
U.S. government agencies routinely spy on everyone, including American citizens.”).
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everyone, even the government, though “the reality is that cyber ad-
versaries will exploit any vulnerability they find.”123
The FBI also recognizes the need to secure information from
United States adversaries by using advanced encryption technology
and more secure networks, but it also recognizes that “absolute secur-
ity does not exist in either the physical or digital world.”124 If a cyber-
attack occurs and the FBI is unable to access encrypted information or
systems, it “may not be able to identify those who seek to steal our
technology, our state secrets, our intellectual property, and our trade
secrets.”125
In the past, communications services companies produced devices
that allowed law enforcement to decrypt a device or program; how-
ever, now only limited information may be retrieved, making it “in-
creasingly difficult” for the FBI to “investigate and prevent crime and
terrorist threats.126 If this becomes the norm, it will be increasingly
difficult for us to investigate and prevent crime and terrorist
threats.”127 Where some citizens may prefer the government to be less
involved, others recognize a “need not only for tougher sentencing for
criminals who use encryption to commit and hide their illegal activity,
but also for more sophisticated measures to prevent these crimes from
occurring in the first place.”128
Advancing technology in other areas presents more complex chal-
lenges for regulating agencies and law enforcement. For example, the
entrance of AI and machine learning technology has alerted govern-
ment officials to predict security issues and to anticipate malicious use
for any new technological advancement.129 Specifically, the use of AI
technology may result in cyber threats exceeding what human hackers
can currently accomplish.130 Although machine learning offers techno-
logical advancement that would benefit the defense industry, it could
also make the defense industry more vulnerable to cyberattacks.131
Red Teams are becoming more commonplace within the cybersecurity
community and are implemented to discover breaches in information
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The United States government recognizes the need for cyber-
security to protect its products, technology, and information, and it
implements regulations in an effort to protect those products. Defense
industry companies must develop programs to comply with govern-
ment regulations.
VI. DEFENSE INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS
A. General Government Guidance
Companies in the defense industry must ensure that they comply
with United States export regulations and statutes related to the ex-
port and use of encrypted items. Additionally, companies should be
aware of the risks to sensitive and export controlled information, such
as ITAR technical data and EAR technology, and take action to pro-
tect that information.
For instance, the State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Con-
trols Compliance (“DTCC”) issued “Compliance Program Guide-
lines” (DTCC Guidelines) to assist defense industry companies.133
The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security is-
sued its own “Export Compliance Guidelines: The Elements of an Ef-
fective Compliance Program” (BIS Guidelines).134
The DTCC Guidelines state that companies involved in the export
of items controlled by the ITAR should develop a “[c]omprehensive
operational compliance program” which should “include manuals that
articulate the processes to be followed in implementing the company
program.”135 The BIS Guidelines distinguish eight elements of an ef-
fective compliance program: management commitment, risk assess-
ment, export authorization, recordkeeping, training, audits, export
violation correction, and export compliance program establishment
and maintenance.136 The DTCC Guidelines and the BIS Guidelines
are similar and good resources for defense industry companies when
creating and maintaining effective compliance programs.
The DTCC Guidelines specify that the components of an effective
compliance program include the following: (1) implementing an “Or-
ganization Structure” with charts, descriptions, and management
structures indicating the company’s trade functions; (2) and tracking
the compliance of United States export controls.137 The structure of
the organization should be readily available to all employees, and it
should provide the information for responsible parties within the com-
133. Compliance Program Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., DIRECTORATE OF DEF.
TRADE CONTROLS (2016) [hereinafter DDTC Guidelines].
134. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., EXPORT COMPLIANCE
GUIDELINES: THE ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM (2017) [herein-
after BIS Guidelines].
135. DDTC Guidelines, supra note 134.
136. BIS Guidelines, supra note 135, at 1.
137. DTCC Guidelines, supra note 134.
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pany and include their titles and individual responsibilities.138 Senior
management should make a corporate commitment to follow United
States export control regulations and create and implement a com-
pany policy that is aligned with those regulations.139 Senior manage-
ment should also emphasize for all employees the importance of
compliance with United States export control regulations and define
each employee’s individual role in helping the company maintain
compliance.140
Management should devote adequate resources to compliance mat-
ters and elect senior executives to complete everyday export and im-
port operations and compliance management.141 Each business area
and department should have its own operating procedure for handling
export and import compliance matters.142
Defense industry companies should also track the movement of ex-
port controlled items from the time of manufacture or purchase to the
time of export.143 Compliance officers should consider employee
knowledge of export regulations, how this knowledge applies to the
employees’ daily tasks, who to contact with assistance in exporting
items or information, recordkeeping requirements, and any changes to
regulations.144
Compliance officers should also ensure that employees are aware of
regulation requirements for the subsequent retransfer of exported
items controlled by regulations.145 Compliance programs should in-
clude procedures for screening parties that are restricted from export
and any high-risk transactions.146
Export control regulations require recordkeeping for years after use
of export authorizations, and compliance programs should include
procedures for maintaining and reviewing these records.147 The pro-
grams should conduct additional review to ensure compliance mea-
sures are effective and no violations have occurred; in addition, the
programs should perform self-assessments and audits regularly to as-
sess high-risk areas and any areas within the company that could use
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Compliance programs should also maintain training programs for
employees to understand compliance requirements. When issues do
occur, employees should know who to report suspected violations to
within the corporation and how much supporting evidence to provide
regarding the violation.
The DTCC and BIS Guidelines offer high level guidance on imple-
menting and maintaining a compliance program. However, these pro-
grams must attempt to balance business requirements, comply with
regulations, and adapt to changing regulations and technology.
B. Compliance Programs in Action
In November 2017, the former Acting Director for the DTCC, Ar-
thur Shulman, provided the defense industry with some outgoing gui-
dance on compliance with export control regulations.149 He
recommended reporting any data hacking instance to the DTCC as a
potential unauthorized export of export controlled information.150
Shulman stated that export controlled information is presumably re-
leased during a hack, unless it can be proven otherwise.151 To protect
export controlled information, Shulman stated that companies should
“(1) Know what you have (proper classification); (2) Know where you
have it; and (3) Know who has access to it.”152
When investigating issues with export controlled information, de-
fense industry trade compliance personnel should work with IT and
security personnel within their company to gather details and resolve
issues.153 Trade compliance personnel should utilize internal databases
and other IT systems to mitigate and correct as part of the investiga-
tion and voluntary disclosure drafting process.154
Defense industry companies must implement compliance programs
that are effective in ensuring their employees understand their role in
export control compliance. It is easier to approach training from a
teaching standpoint, with lecture-style courses and quizzes to test un-
derstanding, but it is far more effective to train employees to change
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employees what they need to do habitually as part of their daily tasks
instead of trying to impart abstract legal concepts.156 Compliance of-
ficers have the responsibility to understand the regulations well
enough to synthesize procedural steps adaptable to all types of em-
ployees and job functions.157 Relying on employees’ memorization in
a regularly scheduled training plan may be easy for compliance of-
ficers, “but it makes actually complying incredibly difficult for em-
ployees.”158 Essentially, effective compliance training begins with
recognizing that employee norms need to change, and that process
begins with behavioral changes, not teaching advanced concepts.159
Compliance programs are constantly challenged to keep up with ad-
vancing technology and changes to regulations while also ensuring all
employees understand their individual roles in maintaining compli-
ance and securing company information.
VII. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY
A. Regulation Reform
BIS issued a final rule that went into effect on September 1, 2016, as
part of the Departments of Commerce and States’ initiative to reform
export control regulations.160 The final rule states:
[T]ransmitting or storing electronic data that meet certain security
standards would not constitute an export of that data, provided that
the technology or software is: (1) Unclassified; (2) Secured using
“end-to-end encryption”; (3) Secured using cryptographic modules
(hardware or software) compliant with Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) or its succes-
sors, supplemented by software implementation, cryptographic key
management, and other procedures and controls that are in accor-
dance with guidance provided in current United States National In-
stitute for Standards and Technology publications, or other equally
or more effective cryptographic means; and (4) Not intentionally
stored in a military-embargoed country or in the Russian
Federation.161
Because of this final rule, the EAR now includes a definition of
“end-to-end encryption” which is “(i) the provision of cryptographic
protection of data such that the data are not in unencrypted form be-
156. Id.
157. See id. (“Instead of taking training on a scheduled basis and hoping you re-
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tween originator (or the originator’s in-country security boundary)
and an intended recipient (or the recipient’s in-country security
boundary); and (ii) the means of decryption are not provided to any
third party.”162 Access information in the EAR is now defined and
includes things like “decryption keys, network access codes, and pass-
words.”163 According to this rule, any victim of an encrypted data
breach will not be found responsible for the transfer of the data so
long as the person sending the EAR controlled information withheld
access information to the encrypted data.164 Defense industry compa-
nies will certainly benefit from these more relaxed rules, at least in
terms of EAR controlled technology, but it must keep in mind that
this final rule for the EAR does not apply to ITAR controlled techni-
cal data.165
On April 12, 2018, the House Financial Services Monetary Policy
and Trade Subcommittee completed its last hearing on a bill to
“broaden the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS)” on business arrangements between the
United States and foreign parties and the transfer of sensitive technol-
ogy.166 A representative for the technology industry stated that the
current export control system is the correct method for governing sen-
sitive technology transfers.167 The bill drafter, Representative Robert
Pittenger, criticized current export control regulations for its failure to
prevent China from acquiring United States technology.168
The House Foreign Affairs Committee introduced a bill in February
of 2018 “to renew the legislative basis for United States dual use ex-
port controls for the first time in nearly twenty years.”169 The Export
Control Reform Act (ECRA) “offers both risks and rewards for U.S.
and non-U.S. companies with an interest in United States technology
exports. U.S. subsidiaries of non-U.S. companies should watch the bill
closely, as the current legislative test treats them as “foreign persons”
and could restrict their ability to exchange technology with other
United States companies.”170
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The results of ECRA could strongly affect controls and technology
development for United States companies working in technologies
such as advanced aerospace.171 Current processes for determining
items that require control under the regulations have improved re-
cently, but the regulations still need to be modernized to capture new
technologies.172 Additionally, some regulations make it difficult for
defense industry companies to comply and conduct business without
increasing national security.173 The proposed ECRA would replace
the Export Administration Act (“EAA”) “with legislation that does
not require regular re-approval by Congress.” It would give the Presi-
dent authority to control exports, re-exports, and transfers of items by
persons anywhere in the world.174
In 2011, President Barack Obama instituted the New International
Strategy for Cyberspace to produce the following:
“[A]n international environment that ensures global networks [is]
open to new innovations, interoperable the world over, secure
enough to support people’s work, and reliable enough to earn their
trust. To achieve it, we will build and sustain an environment in
which norms of responsible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain
partnerships, and support the rule of law.”175
These norms include: “Upholding Fundamental Freedoms, Respect
for Property, Valuing Privacy, Protection from Crime, Right to Self-
Defense, Global Interoperability, Network Stability, Reliable Access,
Multi-Stakeholder Governance, [and] Cybersecurity Due
Diligence.”176
The United States recognizes the need to not only govern and regu-
late exports of products, information, and technology but also to
adapt regulations that reflect advancements in technology and the
need for defense industry companies to implement strong cyber-
security defenses. Defense industry companies are also challenged to
keep up in an ever-evolving cyber world.
B. Keeping Up in the Defense Industry
With encryption technology advancing beyond the pace of policy
publication, defense industry companies must not only abide by rele-
vant regulations but should take concerted action to protect against
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3.
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cyber threats.177 Our reliance on cyber technology exposes individuals
and companies to new risks related to the protection of
information.178
Currently, cyber-crime “may be the greatest threat to every com-
pany in the world.”179 It is estimated that cyber-crime costs the global
business industry hundreds of billions of dollars each year, and by
2019 that number will increase to approximately $1.2 trillion.180 This
increase can be attributed to the “rapid digitization of consumers’
lives and enterprise records” and to the production of more profes-
sional and successful cyber-attacks.181 “[C]ybersecurity concerns that
were once primarily about data security, privacy[,] and free speech are
now concerns about (1) human safety and (2) the operational preser-
vation of industrial and financial infrastructure.”182
Data breaches are becoming more common, and they can affect a
company’s reputation. However, companies statistically rely heavily
on third-parties providing them access to the company’s networks and
systems.183 To keep up with advancing technology and increased reli-
ance on third-party vendors, companies should mitigate risks by rely-
ing on automated processes to manage access to databases, which will
save time and delay business but still ensure security for sensitive
company information.184 Defense industry companies should be aware
of the issues involved with controlling the technology, regulating ex-
port of the technology, and reacting to data hacking events.
Earlier this year, a global software company was charged with vio-
lating United States regulations in the release of export controlled in-
formation and access to sensitive data.185 The software company
settled and agreed to implement an “Enhanced Security Plan” which
includes security enhancements and requirements.186 Some examples
177. See Pyetranker, supra note 67, at 153 (“[C]oncerted action –rather than pas-
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of these requirements include: restricting and controlling access by
U.S. and non-U.S. persons; implementing a security policy; and ap-
pointing a Security Director to ensure compliance with United States
regulations and company policies.187
In addition to adopting measures to answer current regulations,
companies should consider and prepare for technological advance-
ments and regulation reforms. Technologies may advance and regula-
tions may change, but how people respond to change is also a
factor.188
Hess’s sentiments in 2015 regarding encryption technology are still
a concern for government officials today, and they are taking ac-
tion.189 In response to Apple and Google announcing that they would
strengthen their encryption products in 2014, former FBI director,
James Comey, stated that “end-to-end encryption prevents law en-
forcement from collecting electronic evidence required to keep
America safe.”190 Comey and other government officials, like their
predecessors, seek to require “backdoors” into encryption products
for the government.191 Unlike previous calls from the government for
access to encrypted communications, these newer requests emphasize
terrorism as the reason for the requested access.192
On April 24, 2018, Lieutenant General Paul Nakasone was con-
firmed as the new Commander of the United States Cyber Command
and the director of the National Security Agency.193 Nakasone’s ap-
proach towards cyber security is described as “hawkish” but approved
by Congress.194 Nakasone is replacing Admiral Michael Rogers who
retires after serving almost four years in the position.195 Previously,
Nakasone served as the general of United States Army Cyber Com-
mand and controlled the United States Cyber Command’s joint Task
Force ARES, which assisted the military in combating the Islamic
State group.196 With the confirmation of Nakasone, Cyber Command
intends to be elevated to “a fully combatant command.”197
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Concurrent with Nakasone’s win, calls for new legislation to create
a backdoor into encryption are coming forward once again.198 These
“surveillance hawks” include FBI director Christopher Wray and Sen-
ators Dianne Feinsten and Richard Burr.199 However, privacy advo-
cates reject the idea of unlocking devices for government investigation
even though surveillance hawks state they are specifically concerned
about access to devices used for criminal or terrorist activity.200 En-
cryption product manufacturers fight the requests for a government
backdoor because “compromised encryption standards would reduce
their ability to compete in the international market.”201
When the United States government decides to update export con-
trol regulations or amend the Export Control Reform, defense indus-
try companies must adapt their processes and procedures to reflect
the changes within a timely manner. In 2013, the intention behind Ex-
port Control Reform was to allow more flexibility when exporting
items that are of less concern to national security.202 However, any
change to export controls requires an overhaul of export compliance
measures for defense industry companies.  In changing the processes
and procedures to reflect the reform, it may take considerable time
and manpower—specifically, changing the norms for employees who
are accustomed to conducting business a certain way for many years.
Recent Export Control Reform related to the export or transfer of
EAR controlled encrypted technology allows companies to use a vari-
ety of “cloud computing and cloud storage solutions” that were not
permissible in the past.203 Although the rules may provide more op-
tions for the use and transfer of encrypted data, defense industry com-
panies must continuously implement security measures.204
Additionally, the changes to the EAR are not mirrored in the ITAR;
therefore, defense industry companies especially must distinguish be-
tween EAR controlled technology and ITAR controlled technical
data when using cloud services for storage and transfer.205 Changes to
export control regulations provides the opportunity for defense indus-
try companies to reassess their compliance programs.206
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States government is beginning to recognize the need
for more advanced security measures to protect domestically pro-
duced technology and information, especially information that puts
national security at risk. Specifically, the technology and information
produced by United States defense industry companies should be pro-
tected from getting into the hands of our foreign adversaries at all
costs. In response to the growing need for security measures, the
United States government has implemented new programs, commis-
sions, agencies, and projects to create more robust security systems
and regulations. The United States should employ the most talented
and experienced cybersecurity professionals to innovate and produce
security systems that protect our nation’s most sensitive information.
The government should then provide these systems to its defense in-
dustry companies at minimal cost and should require companies to
use the best technology in its security measures.
With or without the government’s assistance, defense industry com-
panies within the United States must also implement their own mea-
sures of protection. Current policies offer little protection of sensitive
and export controlled information including encrypted items and in-
formation. In addition, the government should also provide the de-
fense industry companies better guidance and access to resources in
order to assist them in protecting the important information and en-
crypted items.207 For example, any new systems or software purchased
by the United States should be made available to defense industry
companies as the standard. If the government truly wishes to protect
its most important technology and information, it should provide the
new systems at minimal cost to the defense industry. Advancements in
security programs should be shared with defense industry companies
as soon as they are available and ready for use. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment may not want to provide defense industry companies with
the best security technology because in the event that the government
needs to conduct an investigation, a company utilizing strong cyber-
security and encryption software is much more difficult to investigate.
Alternatively, the United States could update current regulations to
require that defense industry companies must utilize specific security
measures or face a penalty for failing to do so. Such regulation could
require defense companies to implement more robust security pro-
grams with updated security software. This is a less effective solution
determine whether they can avail themselves of the new provisions regarding techni-
cal data and software.”).
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as the advancement in cyberattack technology increases so rapidly,
and reformed regulations will likely be outdated as soon as they are
implemented. It makes more sense to require that defense companies
must implement the most updated software and programs determined
by government security experts and cyber-security experts. Also, by
allowing defense companies to decide which security companies it will
work with, the defense companies obtain the option to shop for the
best and most expensive program, or the company could choose the
cheapest option, resulting in less efficient security. Cybersecurity reg-
ulations that are too specific run the risk of being outdated quickly,
whereas broad requirements leave the option for companies to imple-
ment the lowest of security measures.
Even if the government declines these suggested measures, defense
industry companies should make the protection of their sensitive in-
formation and encrypted items top priority. This method would re-
quire complete buy-in from the senior management within the
company and a thorough flow-down of cultural beliefs among its em-
ployees. A change in norms must be implemented, and defense indus-
try personnel should be inundated with reminders on the importance
of information security. Companies should provide employees with
easy access to guidance, training, and assistance in handling, sharing,
protecting, and exporting sensitive and export controlled information.
Changing company culture takes time, and failure to change person-
nel beliefs will result in a lack of understanding and potential viola-
tions of export control regulations. In the worst cases, data spills and
cyberattacks could result in the loss of sensitive or even classified in-
formation that could jeopardize national security. Huge unauthorized
data releases of sensitive information will negatively affect a com-
pany’s reputation thus affecting its ability to generate revenue.
The risks in using and exporting encryption technology and sensi-
tive information should be a major concern for defense industry com-
panies. This concern should motivate the government to invest
significant resources into compliance programs. Resources such as
dedicated and qualified personnel can create policy and procedure to
ensure compliance with United States government regulations, and
the procedures will provide guidance and training to all employees. In
addition, companies should employ IT security, data security, and
counterintelligence personnel to work with the compliance team in
innovating preventive measures and in addressing any potential data
releases and export violations. Immediate actions and counter mea-
sures should be prioritized not just among the compliance and security
teams but should be a known, expected response from all employees.
In other words, cybersecurity norms should be instilled company-wide
and thoroughly policed from within the company. How a company
chooses to implement such measures remains discretionary, but a bet-
ter resourced compliance department dedicated to implementing ef-
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fective policies and responding quickly to potential issues will prevent
export control violations and data releases of important information.
Defense industry companies transfer export controlled information
that may subject the United States to security risks. The United States
responds to this risk by implementing regulations to control the high-
risk exports. Defense industry companies must comply with these reg-
ulations. Therefore, defense industry companies should approach ex-
ports and cybersecurity from the standpoint that technology is always
advancing—failure to simultaneously advance security and compli-
ance measures will leave the country and the company vulnerable to
attack.

